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AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF STEWARDSHIP THEORY 
James l);w is, Uni versity o iNotre Da me 
Steven Fra nkfo rt e r. Winthrop Uni versity 
Da vid Vo llrath, Indiana Uni ve rs ity South Bend 
Vanessa llill , Uni ve rs ity o l Loui s iana , Lalayette 
This slu t~)' 1es1s !h e model of Davis, Schoormau , aud Drmaldsou (/ 99 7) llwl proposed delermiuaul.\' of a company's 
govemauce .\'lruc/Ure. lu parlicular, we focus uu I he slewardship 1/wury a.\pecls of !he model a uri ils ability to predict th e 
presence of a slewarrf.l·hip-orieulatiou CEO at publicly listed U.S. companies. Using survey based data obtained from 
CL'O.~ all(/ directors of I 00 compauie.1· iu a match-pair desixu, we identified three va riables that predicted th e occurrence 
of stewardship-oriented behavior.\· by th e company's CEO. These results feud support for th e model's ability to predict 
tl1e conditions under which steward.l11ip-orieuterl iudividua/.1· becom e CEOs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Wor ldco m. Ad lphi a, T yco, :J ttd Emon, an,; among th e 
numerous examples of wanton opportu nism leading to th e 
dec I inc or demi se o f large, import ant ecott o tn ic insti tuti ons. 
Thi cri sis o f integrit y poses h<trd shi ps !'or multiple 
constitu enc ies, and w ill continue to rece i ve legal il m l regulil! Or) 
att enti On lo r yeat·s 10 CU tllC ' I he C0 111111 0 tl ll'tSdom 0 1' tucb y' ' 
dominant co rporat e govcm ancc th co rt cs (e g. :Jgc ncy th eOI"y) 
pre~c r ibc stronge r monit Ot"i ng ~tn d tn o t·c lucrati ve ali gnm ent 
incenti ves in th e hope of di mitti shing th e dangers opportuni sti c 
manager !> pose to soc iety (17ama & Jensen, 1983) . ll owever, 
questi ons rega rdin g w heth er such stt·uctural remedies ca n cove r 
all poss ible threats continue to persist . For exa mple, DeA nge lo 
( 1988) fo und that managers manipu late inco me to achieve 
bonus targets 111 th e presence of incenti ve ali gnment 
mechani sms, bringing int o ques ti on w hether ince ntive 
ali gnment m ec hanisms can rel iabl y at tili n their intended goals. 
Simil arl y, W illi il mson ( 1985) argued th at managers pursuing 
sel r- interes t w ith guil e may be suf'fi c icntl y in venti ve a11d 
inge nious to thwart eve n well -conceived monit orin g 
mechanism s. In such li ght , it i ~ doubtfu l thiit structural 
protec ti ons could success ful ly guat·d against all threa ts atl 
in ve nti ve exec uti ve co u ld improv ise. 
A n alt ern ati ve approach to cottt rn ll ing th e appeti te of th e 
opport utti sti c shark s that may n1anagc a g ive n co rporati on is to 
avo id emp loy ing such indi vi duals it t leadership positil)t l S. 
Dav t-, ct a l. ( 1997) proposed il heur isti c to identiry e:-.c:cuti vcs 
n: lkct tn g an oppo rtuni ~ t ori etil :lli on o1· st<.:l l 'il rdship 
ortc: ntat ion to th e li nn . l hey C\> nl ended th at ex ccuti 1e 
p'>yc lwlog tGil and flm t '> ituattOtl :tl l <~c t ms cou ld l)L' measured 
attd ev:ilu :J tcd to detu nttne th e appr tl :tch th e c::-.ec tttt ve would 
ctnp lny at th e linn . Thtt s, tl upportunt sts :tnd ol cw<tl·ds catt he 
rc l t:tbl y d ist ingu ished, opt im ;il go ve l'll <l tiCe Stl'ltCiures <I lid 
po li cie'> lnr either <tppmach could be implemented . W hile th e 
ntode l prov id es a va luab le heut·i -; ti c, th e <Ju th ors 1·ccogni ze d a 
need rm th e empiri cal testing o r its components. In thi s paper 
11c em pir ica ll y cx:~ min c th e proposed psycho log icil l and 
st lu<Hi \l nal <J nt cccdcnts to stewa rdship-or ientated co rpo rate 
gO\c rn <J ncc that Da v is c t al. ( 1997) proposed . 
I he crea t ion il nd mil intenance o r il 111anagerial system based 
on ste11<t rd ship pr inc ip les al igns exec utive psycho log ica l and 
40 
compan y situati onal va riabl es so th at EOs can be empowered, 
rather th an contm lled (Dilv is et al. , 1997) . Wi II iamson ( 1985) 
acknow ledges thi s poss ibilit y but sides in favor o f employi ng 
stru ctut·il l protec tions aga inst opportuni sm , arguing that th e 
tru ·tworthin ess o f' a p:t rti cu lilr manager may not be known w i th 
contplete :1ssurance . l lowcvcr, o thers il t·gue th at tru stworthin ess 
is reliabl y recogniza bl e, and w hen unfett ered wi th undue 
contro l \ truUut·es, tn: ty lead to pro litabl c opponunit ies thar 
wo uld o th c rw t ~e tl O be pt·cscnt ( Frattk , 1988; Qu inn & Jones, 
1995 ; a i. 1997) . D<~vi s et al. ( 1997) nrgue th at opportunist-
o t· steward -o ri ent ed govern <J nce Ci1 n be success fu l w hen 
princ ipals co rrec tl y identify under ly in g age nt psycho logy and 
firm - leve l. situat ional factors. 
Stewardship T heo r y 
Steward ship theory (Dav is c t al. , 1997 ; D onaldson & Dav is, 
1989, 199 1) pro v ides il norm at ive per pective int o th e nillure of 
th e managers th at se rves as il n altern<Jti ve to agency th eory. 
Whi le stewa rdship th eory h <:~ s borrowed some of th e Silme 
terms co mmon ly used in agency th eory research, such as 
"agent ," " pt·in c ipal, " and " <J ii gnment ," r:tdi call y different ro les 
arc ilSS Utlt ed . T hese term s wi ll be used to desc r ibe executi ve-
shJreho iJer relations under either <tn agency o r steward ship 
govern ance stru cture. G t·o tmd ed in psyc ho logy, soc io logy, and 
leadershtp th eori es, stewardship th eory argues lo r the poss ib le 
ali gnment bc tii'Ce tt princ ipals and agents w hi ch is rc n cc ti ve o f 
a psyc ho logica l contract (Sc hetn , I % 5; Y an, Z hu , & II all , 
2002) ur a c lthe re l :~t i o n s hip (U v: i, 1996) , w ith agents 
hclta v ing 111 a community- loc used tnilnner, d irec ting 
tru -, tw<H·tlt ; ~ tn d ur mora l behav iors towa t·ds th eir finn s and its 
~ t ock lt o ld e r\. Stewardship -o ri ented leaders der ive utilit y by 
se rv tn g tlt c need <; o l· til l' cmpora ti on a11d it s stak eho lders rath er 
thatt by put·s uitl g shon - tcnn opportuni sm at th ei1· employe t·s ' 
expense ( l ) ;tv is, c t al. , 199 7; Ft·il nk . 1988) . T he primary 
obsta c le to e!Tectively imp le111 enting a steward ship approach to 
govern att ce is to acc un11 ely distin gui sh ing between 
opportuni sts ilnd stew<J rds. Misa li gning corpo rate governance 
st t·uctures w ith executi ve ori entati on could res ult in seve re 
losses to th e llrtn . Dav is et a l. ( 1997) identified psychologica l 
and situati onal antecedents that wou ld permit principa ls to 
di stin guish between opportuni sti c and tru stworth y agents. The y 
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argue that when situati ons at a compa ny favo r a stewardship-
oriented govern ance stru cture, th en steward-or iented execut ives 
should be employed as CEOs. 
Quinn and Jones ( 199 5) and Uzz i ( 1996, 1997) argued that, 
with experi ence, one can identify trustworth y agent s and then 
sa fely rely on th ese agents to behave w ith se l f- r·es traint and to 
serve the good of the company. Such individu als forge 
relati onships wherein they create uni que competit ive 
advantages through investment in relati onship-spec i fi c assets 
(Jones, 1995), pursuit of long-term val ue-bui ld ing strateg ies 
(Davis et al. , 1997), access to propr ietary and/or fi ne-grained 
inform ation (Uzzi, 1996), increased commitment and 
invo lvement in the affairs of th e firm (Yan et al. , 2002), and 
improved access to key resources (Uzz i, 1996). 
H ypotheses: Testing Dav is, Schoorman, and Donaldson' s 
Heuristic 
We test the mode l that Dav is, et al. ( 1997) proposed to 
predict the conditions fo r a stewardshi p-ori ented co rporate 
governance to flourish. We obtained survey responses and then 
assoc iated CEO-report ed psycholog ical and situa ti onal factors 
aga inst direc tor-reported obse rv:-~ ti o n s o f the steward shi p 
attribu tes o f th eir CEOs. 
Psychological Factor s 
M oti vation: Steward s are primaril y moti va ted by higher 
ord er needs, such as opportunity o f growt h, achievement . 
affili ati on , and se l f-actu ali za t ion (Dav is, et al. , 1997). T his 
di ffers fro m opport unists, who are mot iva ted by ex tr insic 
fac tors I ike tangible rell'a rds and incenti ves possess ing a 
measurab le market va lue. CEOs pr imar i ly moti va ted by higher 
order needs fi nd per fo rm ance o f or·ganizati onal work itse l f to 
be a strong moti va ting factor. The basis for the ass umpti on 
lin k ing the pursuit o f hi gher· order needs to a stewardship 
ori entati on can be found in most of the estab li shed theori es o f 
moti vati on, in parti cular, higher Ol'dcr needs as descri bed by 
M aslow's hierarchy ( 1970), A lder fer's growth need ( 1972). and 
th e achievement and affili ati on needs of M cClelland ( 1975) 
and M cG regor ( 1967). O pportuni sts, look at work 
instrumentall y, expend ing effo rt s when there is materi al 
compensati on for their effo rts (Fama & Jensen, 1983) . 
A steward w ill tend to be int r insica ll y moti va ted and wi ll 
form internal chall enges th :-~ t lead to hi gher leve ls of 
performance as well as sa t i s f;:~ c ti o n w ith hi s/her wo r" . 
Hackman and O ldham ( 1976) argued th at three psycholog ica l 
states (experi enced meani ngfu lness o f work, ex peri enced 
responsib ility for outcomes. and know ledge o f actual results) 
mediate the relati onship between task character isti cs and 
intern al work mot iva ti on. T his model o f wo r·k moti va t ion i ~ one 
o f th e foundati onal ass umpt ions o f stewil rdshi p th eo ry M:~ n z 
( 1986) argued th at se l f- e fl~ caC). se l f-determinati on. and 
fee lings of purpose are ch :~ rac t c ri zcd as bt> ing n it ica l 
determinants of intr insic moti va ti on. Conve r·sc ly, th e agency 
approach emphas ize the ro le or ex tr insic rewards in 
moti va ting a CEO, employ ing a tit - lo r- tat perspec tive in which 
rewards are conti ngent on effort and tang ib le result s. Absent 
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ex trin sic moti va tors. agents would tend to shirk their 
res pons ibi I it ies . 
H ypoth es is I : Execut ives reportin g higher order needs 
mot ivat ion w i ll be positi ve ly assoc iated with d irector 
observat ion of stewardship-or iented CEO behav ior . 
H y poth es is 2: Exec ut ives reporting low ex tr in sic 
moti va ti on w ill be pos it ive ly assoc iated w ith director 
observat ion of stewardship-ori ented CEO behav ior . 
I dentifica tion: M anagers ident i fy w ith an organi zati on 
when they de fin e themse lves in terms o f an organ izat ional 
membershi p wherein they accept it s miss ion, vi sion, and 
objecti ves ( K elman, 1958; M ae l & A shfot1h, 1992) . Under 
these condit ions, the organi za ti on becomes an extension o f the 
manager's psycholog ica l structure (B rown, 1969). A n 
identi fy ing manager interprets comm ents about the 
organi zati on as referrin g also to himse l f or hersel f, allow ing 
managers vicar iously exper ience the organi za ti on's successes 
and failu res (e .g. , Katz & K ahn , 1978 ; T urn er, 198 I ) . T his 
v iew of organizational identi fi ca t ion is consistent w ith 
steward ship. 
When managers ex tern al ize 01·ganizati onal prob lems to 
avo id b lam e or sh ift responsib il it y to others (D ' A veni & 
MacMi llan , \990) they cl o not identify w ith the organi za ti on 
nne! he/she w i ll v iew the organi zati on onl y in instrumental 
term s, foc using on how using it may personall y benefit him or 
her (Jenst> n & M eck l in g, 1976) . T hus, an orga ni zati onal foc us 
required fo r identifi ca ti on is lac k ing. T his is consistent wi th the 
agency theory perspect ive . 
H y poth esis 3: Execut ives reportin g h igh identifi ca ti on 
ll' it h the mga ni zati on w ill be positi ve ly assoc iated w ith 
cl irectm observa ti on of stewa rdshi p-ori ented CEO 
behav ior. 
Va lu e co mmitm ent: Va lue commitment is th e beli ef in and 
:~ccep t an ce of orga nizational goa ls and va lues (Mayer and 
Schoorm an, 1992). T he se l f- image o f orga ni zat ionall y va lue-
comm itted managers refl ects the company ' s image (Ecc les & 
Nohr ia, l ':t J2) . Va lue co mm itted executi ves dctine themselves 
in term s of th eir membership in their parti cul ar organi zati ons 
(Mae l & A shforth , 1992), produc ing a sati sfy ing relati onship 
(S uss man & V ecchio. 1982). V alue comm itted executi ves 
possess a psycho log ica l al ignment w ith their organ izati ons or 
pri ncipals because they shar·e the same v ision. values. and 
mi ss ion, and exert considerab le effort to sec that th e 
o rg;:~ni za ti o n succeeds (D::tv is, et al .. 1997). Converse ly, 
opport unists tend to p lace import ance on m::t teri al ga in ra th er 
th :1 r1 va lues . The) lack commitment or all egiance to 
orgar1i zat ions. v iew ing the fi rn1 as an instrum ent 11·ith w hi ch to 
achieve per·so r1 :1lmatc r·i:J I grt in (Fa ma and Jensen, 1983). 
H y po tl11:s is ~: Exec uti ves report ing hi gh va lue 
comm itm t> nt 11 i ll be positi ve !) assoc iated w ith direc tor 
observa ti on o f steward ship-ori ented CEO behav io r-. 
Pe rso nal Power : G ibson, l van cev ich ::tnd Donnell y ( 199 1) 
classified power as either personal or instituti onal . A manager's 
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personal power is developed w ithin the context of th e 
interpersonal relati onships rather th an the manager's position 
within the fi rm. and is grounded upon the subord inate's 
identi fi ca t ion w i1h and respect for their leader's competence 
and abi l ity . T his form o f power inc ludes French and Raven's 
( 1959) referent and ex per1 power . Director·s w ill perceive CEO 
stewardship when 1hey observe th eir managers utili z ing 
persona l power to modify the behav ior o f their fo llowers 
( Dav is et al. , 1997). Converse ly, opporluni sts wi ll tend to 
employ differenl types o f power than do steward s. For instance, 
they wi ll tend to use coercive or instituti onal power that is 
deri ved by v inue o f their form al author-il y in the orga ni za ti on 
( Dav is, et al, 1997). 
H y poth es is 5 : Execul ive repon ing hi gh personal power 
w ill be pos il ive ly assoc ia1ed w ilh d ir·ector· observa ti on 
o f stewardship-ori ented C EO beha vior. 
Sit ua tiona l Factor s 
M an agem ent philosoph y: /\ rgyri s ( 1973 ) argued fo r ihc 
deve lopment o f norm al iw models of organ iza l ion based on 
se l f-ac tual izing ass umpl ions to create an organizati onal cu lture 
that supported the development of sleward ship types of 
relationshi ps between excc ul ivcs and their firm s. T he position 
advocated by A rgyr is ( 1973) was sim i lar to the argum ent s 
advanced ear lier by McGregor ( 1960) in hi s d iscuss ion o f 
T heory Y manage ment and by Likert ( 196 1) in his compari son 
of Sys tem ~ managern cnl w ith more contro l-o ri ented systems. 
Each o f these iheori sts advocated the deve lopment of 
normalive mode ls o r organi za1i on. break ing w il h tradi 1i onal 
management phil osophies to fac i I ilatc the se l f-actuali zing 
behav iors that arc consistent wi 1h stewardshi p th eory. 
Walton ( 1980, 1985) advoca ted high-commitm ent 
rna nagemcnl ph i loso phv that was char·actcr ized by high 
parti c ipati on. open comm unica ti on, empowerm ent o f wor·kers. 
and th e estab l ishment of trust. Law ler ( 1986 , 1992) elaborated 
on this vi ew by contrasl ing the manage ment phil osophies he 
described as contro l-ori ented ve rsus in vo lve ment -or ienleu . 
Acco rdin g to Law ler. the co n1r·o l-micn1 ed approach is based 0 11 
a rnanagc ment phi losophy th ilt the think in g ami controll ing pa 1·1 
or the work must be: separated from the doing pn rt o f the work 
Invo lve ment -o ri ent ed ::tppi'Oaches cnlphasi;e scl l'-conlr·o l and 
<;c l r- manage mcnt ::t nd do not crc:at c a scp<ll·a t ion a1 nong 
thin k ing. contro l ling. ::t nd do ir 1g th e wol'k . T he key ass ump tion 
in invo lve ment-ol'i ented appi'Oachcs is that when emp loyees ar·e 
given challcnoes and responsib i l it y they wi ll deve lop se l f-
con tro l of th eir he hJv ior. 
T he manage ment phi losophy of an organi za tion can create a 
context in whi ch a stewa rdship approach is maintained. Th e 
creati on o f the invo lve ment -o r ienl ed management "'ill lead to 
the emerge nce o f orga ni;:a ti onal behav iors consistent w ith 
stc11 ard sh ip theory. 
Hypothes is 6: Exec ut i ves reponing high in vo lvement 
situat ions at th eir· co mpa nies w ill be positi ve ly 
assoc iated w ith d irecto r observati on o f steward ship-
ori ented CEO behav ior. 
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C ulture: Hofstede ( 1980, 199 1) described an 
indi v iduali sm-co llectiv ism d imension of culture that 1vould 
support a stewardship-oriented governance structure. The 
individuali sm dimension emphasizes personal goa ls over group 
goals whi le th e co llecti v ist d imension defines the se lf as a part 
of th e group. One's group memberships are an important 
statement o f identi ty and achievement. Co llectivi sts have very 
positi ve allitudes toward harm ony w ithin groups, avo iding 
conn ict and confrontati on, wh ile indi v iduali sts see 
confrontati on as an opportunity to acti vely reso lve conflict by 
communicating more directl y. Co llect ivi sts prefer long-term 
relati onships and wil l frequentl y require more time and expend 
grea ter effot1to become fami liar w ilh others prior to a business 
transacti on. Indiv iduali sts are more short-term oriented, 
choos ing to conduct business independently of persona l 
re i ~Hi o n s hi p s, using a cost-benefit approach to eva luate 
busin ess exchanges, and auempt ing to reduce the ri sks of doing 
business through form al conlr·acts. li enee. co ll ecti v ist cultures 
arc mor-e conducive to stewardship govern ance structures while 
ind iv idual ist ic cultures tend to foster opportu nism. 
H y poth es is 7: Executi ves reportin g co llectivi st cultures 
at their· co mpanies w ill be pos iti ve ly assoc iated w ith 
director observa t ion of stewa rd ship-o ri ented C EO 
behav ior. 
Power di l ance: A second d imension developed by 
Hofstede ( 1980, 199 1) to characteri ze the cross-cu ltural 
di fferences thi s is parti cul arl y releva nt to stewardship is the 
concept of power distance . Power d istance is generall y defined 
as " the ex tent to which less powerful members o f in stitutions 
and orga ni zati ons w ithi n a country expec t and accept that 
power is d istri butcd unequall y " ( Ho fstede, 199 1: 28) . In certain 
cultures, relati ve ly large differences in power among members 
are accepted and to leraled. In a culture w ith hi gh power 
distance, th ere is an acceptance that less powerful members 
w ill be dependent on more powerful members and privil eges 
and statu s symbo ls arc both ex pec ted and popu lar. In low 
powe r· d istance cu lt ures , inequal iti es are minimi zed, the 
independe nce o f th e less power ful is va lu ed and encouraged, 
and status and c lass sy mbo ls are frowned upon ( Hodgells & 
L uth<llh , 1993) In high powe r- d istancc cultures, organi za ti ons 
ar·c cc ntr;tlr zed. and they include large differences in authorit y, 
sal<11·y. and perqui sites . T he oppos it e would be true in a low 
power di ~ t an ce or·ga ni zati on. Low power d istance cultures are 
more conduci ve to the deve lopment of steward shi p relati ons 
because their members p lace greater va lue on th e essential 
equalit y o f all people. 
H y pothesis 8 : Execuli ves reporti ng low power distance 
at th eir compani es wi ll be positi ve ly assoc iated w ith 
director observa t ion o f steward ship-o ri ented CEO 
behav ior. 
M EA SUR ES AND METHODS 
Sample 
We created and mai led a survey to 500 randoml y se lected 
pub lic ly li sted co rporati ons, ta rgeting both the C EO and the 
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boards of directors of these companies in 1997 . The result o f 
the initial mailing and fo llow- ups is th at 16 1 d irectors and 135 
CEOs responded. Stati sti ca l tests comparin g th e mean response 
for the vari ables between waves o f data co llection were 
insignificant , sugges tin g th at later respondents we1·e similar to 
earli er respondent s. We y ielded I 02 matched pairs o f CEO and 
director responses. Miss ing data reduced th e number o f 
companies in our analys is to 100. T his stud y mee ts the 
minimum acceptable response rate o f 20% for sm vey-based 
research ( H itt . Hosk inson, Johnson. & M oese l, 1996) . 
Unmatched responses were used in our fac tor an::ll ys is. but 
were di scarded before we tested hypotheses. 
Dependent Variable 
We measured the dependent va ri able with d irector surveys. 
We deve loped an eight-item scale assessing th e leadershi p 
approach their C EO exhibited. A princ ipal-co mponents factor 
analysis determined w heth er a reduced set o f the component 
sca le items could be extracted. T he th re ho ld estab li shed in 
advance for the se lecti on of factor items were a fac tor load ing 
of .50 or greater and at least a .20 diffe rence between the item 's 
loading with its factor and each o f 1he other fac tors. T he 
analys is o f th e eight co mponenl i tems ind ica ted a two-
component so lution th at ex piJined 56 .-l 0 o o r th e 1·ari ance. T he 
first component possessed fi ve items refl ectin g a stewardshi p-
orientati on. T hese items were totaled for th e subseq uent 
analys is. T he second co mponent consisted of th ree i tems 
unrelated to stewa1·dship and wa s not used. 
Independ ent Variables 
T he independent va1·iab les we re mea sured 11 ith CEO 
surveys. We employed pre-p ub li shed scales to measure th e fi ve 
of th e independent va ri ab les (hi gh order needs. ex trin sic 
mot ivati on, va lue commitment , personal power. :J nd p011er 
d istance) and crea ted new sca les to r th e three remai ning 
independent va ri ab les ( identificat ion. i111 o lvemcnt , and culture) 
using factor analys is. 
First, we se lected the fi ve pre-pub li shed scales. For the first 
two, we used Frankfort er, Dav is, & V ollrath 's (:~00 1 ) 10- item 
high order needs sca le and th eir 9- it em ex trin sic moti va ti on 
scale. The third was a I 0-i tem sca le deve loped by Schechter 
( 1985) measured va lue co mm itm ent. The fourth and firth were 
scales developed by Frost and Stahelski ( 1988) to measure 
power and power distance . T hese sca les arc b:Jscd upon 
French and Raven's ( 1959) bases o f soc ial power and correc ts 
se veral sca le form at confounds found in prev ious research. 
Referent and expert power subsca les were co mbined to fo rm an 
11 - item scale representing pe1·sonal power. Coerc ive. 
legitimate, and reward powe r subscaks were co mbined to form 
a 12-item sca le representi ng po,ver di sta11 Ce. Si 11 ce th ese 
scales had p1·ev iously-estab l ished rel iabil i t) (a lpha) 1neas u1·e<>. 
factor analy is was not necessary to formulate these ll1 c 
measures . 
Second, we applied factor analys is to til t: CEO surve) S fo r 
the three remaining independent va r iab les. empl oy ing th e same 
decision rul es w ith th e independent va ri ables as we did 111 
determinin g th e dependent va ri able. T he analys is o f th e 1-1 
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component items indicated a three -component so lut ion. The 
first component ( identifi cati on) had six items and ex plai ned 
23.4% o f th e va ri ance, th e second ( in vo l vement) had three 
items and ex p lained an additional 16.9% of the vari ance, and 
th e third (cul tu re) had fi ve items and explained an add itional 
15.4% o f th e va1·iance. The sca les for th e dependent and 
independent va ri ab les appear in appendi x A . 
C ontro l Va ri ables 
We inc luded se ven contro l va ri ab les co mm only found in 
co rporate govern ance research: Pro fitabilit y, cap ital 
ex pend itures, stock ownership, dualit y, fir m size, lo ng-term 
compensati on. and board tenure. They are co ntro l va ri ab les in 
the usual, stati sti ca l sense o f th e term. In multi ple regress io n 
analys is, th ey may compete wi th our hypothesized co rrelates to 
account fo1· vari ance in the dependent va ri ab le. A lthough we do 
not frame form al hypotheses in vo l v ing th ese vari ab les, we note 
th at each may serve as a mechanism to contro l CEOs. 
Pro fit ab ility: Dav is et al. ( 1997) predicted th at firms wi th 
good alignment between th e CEO phi losophy and the fi rm 's 
govern ance stru cture would tend to have superi or pro fit abi lit y . 
We measured pro fi tabil it y as th e diffe rence between fi nn and 
th e mean industry relllrns on equit y, ba sed on four-d ig it SICs. 
Data we 1·e co llected from Rese:J rch Insight. 
C apit al Ex penditures: Dav is. et al. ( 1997) argued that 
C EOs w ith a stewa rd ship perspecti ve wi l l possess a lo ng-term 
perspecti ve fm th e firm and w ill pur ue strateg ies th at suppo rt 
long-term perfo rm ance , like makin g cap it al in vestmen ts. 
Ca pi tal ex pend itures we r·e com puted as a fi rm 's capi tal 
expe ndi tu res d iv ided by i ts total asse ts and subt rac t ing th e 
equi va lent ind ustr) mea n, aga in based on fou1·-di g it SICs. Data 
11e re co l lected from Research Insight. 
tock Ownershi p: W here CEO's ho ld greater proporti ons 
Of StOC k. th ere II i ll be grea ter degreeS Of al ig nment ll' itiJ the 
interests o f th e firm and it s shareho lders (Ei senhardt . 1988: 
Jensen & M eck l ing, 1976) . We comp uted stoc k ow nerships as 
the percentage o f th e firm 's comm on shares held by th e 
C EO/ Pre' ;dent. Data were co llected from proxy statements. 
Du ali ty: W hen the CEO also serves as chairman of th e 
board (comrn onl v refe rred to as the dual govc rn :J nce structure), 
he/she ma) lim it the board's contro l o f manage ment 
( Donaldson & Da1·is. 1989 , 199 1: \.Vi ll iamson. 1985). Dual it y 
is a dic hotomous va ri ab le in 11hich 0 represe 111 s out side board 
leadership (kn ow n as the independent governance structure) 
and I rcrrese nt s i n ~ t a nces 11 here th e CEO also ser ves as th e 
chai rm an o f the board. Data we 1·e co l lec ted f rom proxy 
statements. 
Firm size: I' ll <.: siLc of th e firn1 ma y 1ntlucncc the fo rm o f 
powe 1· a Ct::O uses. l-or exa n1p le. a L'EO in a vny large fi rm 
111 a) not h:11 e as much opportunit ) to ha ve th e d i1·ec t contac t 
nccessa1·) tL) t'Stabli sh personal pown. We co lll w ll ed to r fi rm 
size by taking the log o f the totn l numbe r of em ployees 
( F1·ank to n er. et <d., 200 I ). Data 11 ere co l lec1cd from Research 
Insight. 
Lu ng- term compensati on : E:-.ecuti vc co m pensa ti on th at is 
long-term in natu re mi ght be used to ueate ali gnment w hen a 
CEO is ass umed to be opportuni sti c, rather th an possess 3 
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stcwa t·dshi p ori entati on (Jensen & M eck l ing, 1976) . We 
ca lculated long-term compensati on as the percentage of shon 
term to total executi ve compensati on. T hese data were 
co llec ted from proxy statements. 
Board tenure: With stewardship's emphas is on deve loping 
and maintaining long-term relati onships, we anticipate that 
CEO's wi th steward ship philosophies will tend to have served 
on th e board for a relati ve ly long peri od of time. Board tenure 
was measured as :he year the CEO first began service on the 
board . Da ta were co llected from proxy statements. 
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Method 
The data for all but one of the dependent, independent, and 
control vari ab les were continuous. The other one was 
dichotomous. T herefore, we conducted hypothes is testing using 
multiple regress ion analys is. 
Res ults 
Figure I displays a v isual representati on of the control and 
ex perimental vari ab les. 
FIGURE I : Visua l Representation of the Control and Ex perimental Va ri ables 
C unlro l \ 'ariahtcs: 
l'ro llt:~hli>l y 
Cap ll al c.xpe nd>turcs 
Slock ownersl11p 
Du:~ l >l )' 
Fmn \ I ll' 
I ll ll g_- l l: llll CU 1llpC 11 '\ ill 10 11 
I)OaHJ IC i llll\..' 
Ex pnimtnlal \ 'a ria hlcs 
ll>gh Order Needs 
Ex tnn; >c Moi> Vii i> On 
I dcnl>licai> On 
Va lue COilllll>llllCIII 
Pcr...,o na l J>o w~r 
ln vn lvcmc111 
C ullurc 
Tab le I be low shows the descri pti ve stati st ics, alphas, 
va ri ati on in nat ion factors (V I Fs), and the co rrelati on 
matri x. W e measured reliabilit y by comput ing alpha 
scores . A ll alphas exceeded the minimum standard o f 
. 50 fo r ex perim ental va ri ab les and were deemed acceptable 
(N unnall y, 1967) . Addit iona ll y, we obse rved no multi-
co llinearit y problems that would affect th e result s, with only 
one va ri able (high order needs) ex hibited a V IF that exceeded 
2.0, far from the criti ca l I im it of I 0 (Nett er, Wasserman, & 
Kut ner, 1989) . 
Table 1: D escr· iptive S tati st ics, Alph as, Variation Infl a tion Fa c to r·s (VI F s), 
an d t h e Co n e lat io n Matr· ix 
rvh.:all .S I) Alp II :~ VII' Sie \\:il'd - ll >gh Ex tnns1c ldenlli i- Va lu ~ l'c.rso11al 
' h'IJ ord c1 111 U I I V; I{1 0 1l CCIII Oil Cll llll1l - power 
II CCd \ 11111 Cnl 
Sicw:l rlb lllp ~ I 2 1 2 02 7<) 
l l> t:h nnki 11 ccd' 43 ~ I ~ :\8 X3 ~ ()J 10* 
F\1 11 11 '\ IC 111 0 (1\ ill lO ll 2') 92 ) 62 X(, I (,<) 07 41 *' 
ldenlill cai> Oil 20 62 -11 9 71 I 35 -O:i 04 - 06 
Valu._; C {) llllllltlll ~ tll 45 ()(, 3 <JX 86 I 75 2x•,.. 31 ** - 10 .Jo•• 
Pc r~un t ll po wer 39 S5 5 I 0 8 1 I 48 19 47'. 23 ' . 05 t6 
lii \0 \ VC il\Cill 10 21 I 97 71 I 16 26** 04 . 0 1 ()<_) 18 . 09 
Cul ture 20 20 2 37 50 I 6 1 50*** 20 . 25* .09 44*'* . 18 
\ \l\VI: r Cli \U II lCC 25 c I 5 88 8 1 I 20 - 14 -.08 II 03 - 20 ' 12 
l'>ulilahllil ) o c9 n49 1.3 1 09 26 '* 08 12 . 02 .08 
C'<>pll al cx pend>lllres - 14 60 5 1 36 1.1 6 - 13 . OJ - 09 Oc 04 . 13 
Slock O\\ nnsl11p R 08 12 6 I 12 10 - II - 13 14 0 1 -.00 
D11 a l11 y 60 .49 1.33 -O S .02 - 2 1 * II 19 -.05 
F i1111 Sttc 2 66 76 I 46 -04 08 - I~ 24' 06 .06 
Ln ng-lcrm compensat ton 23 20 1. 50 06 09 - 13 34* ** 27 ** 03 
llnard tmurc c4 76 9 t 8 I 43 -.0 1 07 36*** - 25** -.08 OS 
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In volve- Culture 
lll Cill 
Power 
di St (l ll Cc.! 
Pro fi ta-
bi lit y 
Capital Stock Duality 
Expendi - owners hip 




Culture . I 5 
Power di stance -.10 -.24* 
l'rotit abilit y 09 21 * - 05 
Capital expenditures .05 . I 0 -01 .07 
Stock ownership .05 .16 ()) . 19 
Duality I 7 . II -.23 * - 08 
Finn size ()() 08 10 II 
Long·tern l cumpL: nsation -.06 12 06 I 0 
Board tenure - I t} -.20 . 0~ - 16 
• r < .05 
.. p < .0 1 
••• r < .oo 1 
Tab le 2 shows the mu ltip le regression results. Mode l I 
eva luates only the regress ion results measuring th e effect o f the 
contro l var iables on the dependent va riab le (s tewardship) . Thi s 
allows us to distinguish between the effect of the con trol and 
th e experimental vari ab les on th e dependent variabl e. In thi s 
model, if the control va ri ab les have no exp lanatory power over 
lures 
- 16 
07 . 12 
26* -.02 .22. 
I ~ - OJ 2 1 * 
-.06 -.23 * -.28 ** -. 14 -.04 
the dependent vari ab le, the F stati sti c w ill not be stati st ica ll y 
sionifi cant The results for model I show no exp lanatory power 
fo~ any of the control variab les over the dependent va ri ab le. 
Sim ilarl y, the overal l mode l ' s exp lanatory power over the 
dependent va ri able shows an in significan t F of 1.5 8 and an 
adjusted R2 of - .04 . 
Table 2: Mu ltiple Reg ress ion Results 
Variabks 
Constant 
H ig.h order needs 
Ex trinsic mo ti vati on 
ldelllilicati on 
Va lue commitllh.: ll t 
Perso na l power 
l ll vo lv..;ment 
Cultu re 
1\lwcr di .S l1 11 lCe 
Pwli tahi lit y 
Capita l e~ pcnclitun.::-. 
Stnc h: ownership 
Dualit y 
Firm size 
Long-{ crm compcnsati0 11 
Boa rd tenure 
Adjusted R2 
df 
• p < 05 
** p < .0 I 
... Jl < .0111 
t\lode l I 
Beta 
22 .3 I 9.13* ** 
()I () 6 7 
-0 1 -1 OR 
0 1 () 66 
-.32 - 68 
- 09 - 28 
77 65 
- 0 1 - 48 
- 04 
.54 
M odel 2 eva luates onl y the regression results measuring the 
ef fec t of the ex perim ental va ri ab les on th e dependent va ri ab le. 
exc luding the effects of th e contro l va ri ab les. I f th e 
experimental va ri ables have ex planatory power· over th e 
dependent va ri ab le. the F stati sti c wi ll be stati sti call y 
signifi cant. We find that mode l 2 shows good exp lan:1 tory 
power of the ex perim ental va r·iab les over th e dependent 
vari ab le, w ith in vo lvement and cultur-e achiev ing stat isti ca l 
signifi cance. The overall mode l 's ex planatory power over the 
dependent va ri ab le y ielded a stati sti ca ll y signifi cant F of 6.29 
and an adjusted R2 of .30 . 
Mode l 3 disp lays t·csults f'or th e full model. includ in g both 
groups of control and ex perim ental va ri ab les . I f th e contro l 
45 
i\ lodcl 2 i\ l odl'l J 
Beta Beta 
7.20 2.54* 8 73 2.50* 
.06 1.19 09 I 68 * 
.04 1.28 OJ .34 
- 06 -138 -.07 - 1 .57 
.02 .38 .02 -.37 
0 1 . 15 .0 1 20 
20 1 19* 19 2 I 3* 
.J I .J 68*** . .J 7 523*** 
0 I 0 1 - 02 - 73 
- 0 1 - 1.08 
-O J - I 69 
- 0 1 76 
- 62 - I )7 
- 12 -.45 
1.1 7 I 16 
-.0 I -. 18 
10 .36 
6 29*** 4.53 *** 
15 
vMiab les do not interac t wi th the ex perim ental vJriab les. then 
the results found in mode l 3 w ill be sim i lar to th ose foun d in 
mode l 2 and mode l I . In thi s mode l, in vo lve ment and cu ltu re 
contin ued to be stati sti ca ll y significant , whi le hi gher mde r 
needs was stJt isti ca ll y signifi ca nt onl y in th is model. The 
overall model 's ex planatory power over the depende nt var iable 
was simii Jr to tha t o f model 2 , wi th a stati sti cal ly significa nt F 
of 4 .53 and an adj usted R2 of .36 . 
We conducted hypoth es is tes ting using one-ta iled tests 
because d irecti on was predicted. Hypoth eses 6 and 7 achi eved 
clea t· suppon in models 2 and 3, whil e hy po th es is I was 
support ed onl y in model 3. Th us. one of the five psycho log ica l 
and two of th e tlll'ee situat ional were stati sti ca ll y significant. Of 
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I )," " l 1:111k l o • 1 ~ 1 . VP III :i lh. alld II III 
lli c psycho log ical variab les , (' I ~Os 1 ursuil o r higher orckr 
11<.:ed '> ( li ypolli es is I ) was posili ve ly assoc i:11 cd w ilh 
~ l e wa rd s h ip . O r llie SiiU:lliOnaJ V:J r iab lcs, in VO i Ve lllCnl 
( li ) pOihes is 6) and cullurc ( li ypolli csis 7) we re posil i ve ly 
a~soc i a l ed w ill! sleward ship. Over::~ ll , lli c Davi s el al. ( 1997) 
slew<l rd sliip model y ielded good exp lallitl ory power, ex plaining 
highl y significanl leve ls o l' va ri ancc in models 2 ::~ nd 3. 
llbcuss iou ami Future Hesean:h 
l)a v is el al. ( 1997 ) argued I hal slewa rdship- and ::~ ge n cy­
l(lcuscd rc la1ionsli ips rcsull as a maier ol' choice bel wecn 
ag<:: nl s and pri nc ipals. Our slud y find s 11ic CEO-repon .::d 
a nl cc~.:d c n! s ror ~ 1 -:: wards liip assoc ia1 ed wi lh dircc10r 
pc rcc pli o n ~ of' C I:O I) pe, c u n s i ~ l c nl w i11i c.:: II 4 o r I li e Dav is cl 
;II ( 199 7) pr inc ipal -1nnnage r cll(li cc model. 1-'1·o1n our rcsu lh , 
we C811 conc lude il lil l :1 slewardsli ip-ori enl ed ali gn111 e111 
h.:: ! wee n princ ip<ds :1 11d C I ~Os ca11 c!\ i ~ l. 
l' li c l lndin g~ o r thi s <llll ck :1re -, ignillcalll i1 1l wo add i1i onal 
ilr<:: a'> . 1-'ir~ l . i 11 l cs ! ing !lie :1111 eccd.:: nl s o i' <, lcw; Jrcbliip , we 
conllnncd llial !h ose 1:1cl<1rs 11 dll c11d be pl·e ~c lll when dlrl·C IOI''> 
perceive !hal !lie c 1:0 I'> ;1 '> lew;m l While W dl i< llmoll ( 1')~ 5 ) 
<trg 11 ed 11! :11 011e callll OI known u urc whi ch lll(lll :tgcrs w ill acl 
oppnnuni sl ic; ill y ami so agc ncy CO illrols should bc un i vc rsall y 
appli cd, l'ra1 1k ( 1 9~X) . () ui1111 :111d Junes ( 1995) . ami IJ ;; i 
( 1996) prov ide ar:.- u1ncnh :u1d/or cv idcncc 10 I li e C\l lllrary . Our 
findin gs show Ili a! d irec l urs percc i vc slcll':l rdslii p !rail s i11 !lie 
C I:O 11 li en I li e C I:O rc po n ~ psycho logical ami silllali onal 
li 1c1ors consisl <.: lll w i11J Dav is' cl al. ( 1997) n10dcl. 
Second , 1hi ~ sllld y :1 dds lo prc v iuus research by C111pl oy i11g 
'> UI vcy-hascd d:11:1 p1 ov idcd by boil! dircc l o r~ and C I :O~ al llie 
s:unc CQ III J1:1 n) . Corporal c govcm :tn cc rc sc:1rch IS l<tr._:e ly 
dn vcn by dal :t <t vai l:thilil ) <1 11d is lli crermc li111il cd i 11 il ~ 
lil'cdicti ve <thi l il y. Thi s is I ru e u i" prev ious rcsc:1rc li o i' age ncy 
llieo ry, w hich lias bce 11 pl agucd hy inconsislc lll llndings ovu 
11111 e. We be l ic1c 111 ,11 our sl ud y ' s ' " '..: o rprim:1ry dal<~ scrvcs as 
dll e:-.a mplc or lli c hcnc lll s or using pri lllill' )' d:ll :l ovc r 
seconda ry da l:l , prov iding :1 ~ liiiiU:Ird rur lli c C\l llliuclill g o r 
l'11111rc co rpOI':I Ic gm <.: l'llilllCc rc.'> c:l l·cli 
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Appendix A 
Scales 
Dependent Variable (Ans\\ ercd b) directo") 
Please indicate yo ur reac ti on to each o f the fo ll owing statement s 
Stewardship 
I . M y s trategic initialt vcs serve th e co mpa n) 's inte res ts 
2. My hudget initiati ves serve the companJ 's interests 
J. f\1 y initiatives rcgnrdin g Ill ) p o ,H.: r and authori t) sen c the Cll lllp ll ll ) 's int c 1 c-,~.:-. 
4. My initiati ves rega rd ing my pe t !..: ' '\c rv c the compill l) \ tll! C t c ~ t ~ 













llllkpcnJcnt Van:d1lcs (A'""c rcd b) l" l (h) 
Please es timate how important each item is to yo u 
High Order Needs 
I. Exceeding hoard expectati ons of you 
2. The challenge of the work itsc l f 
3. Seeing the results o f yo ur wo rk 
4. Your findin g a so lution to a problem 
5. Your agreement with company va lues 
6. Your agreement with board interests 
7. Increas ing company va lue 
8. Your being a company t eam-p l ay~ r 
9. Performance is on par w ith manag~ r s in similar si tu :1ti ons 
10. Your loya lt y to the company 
Extrinsic Motivation 
I. Recognition fo r yo ur success 
2. Your status within the compan y 
3. Your job securit y 
4. Wages which compare favo rabl y wi th others doing sim i 1M or same job 
5. R~s pec t and re cognition from out side the company lo r yo ur "ork 
6. Amount of yo ur salar) 
7. Opportunit y lo r yo ur advancement 
8. Rece ivi ng praise from th e bo:~rcl lo r a .i <' h well cl one 
9. Your pcrso nCJ I eco nomic gr~ in 
ldcntilication 
I. The longer I sta y with thi s orga ni zati on. the harlk r it is to b n c 
2. It wou ld be dirti cult lo r me to adapt to a nc·w orga ni za ti on 
3. I wo uld give up a lot by leaving thi s orga1tization 
4. I would be wil ling to stay wit h thi s orga ni n ti on until I retire 
5. If I dec ided to leave thi s organi zati on. it would be dirti cultto C\plai n to Ill ) 
fri ends and family 
6. Man y changes wo uld have to occur in 111 ) present c ircumstances to cause 
me to leave thi s organiunion 
Value Commitment 
I. My va lues and th e organi zation's va lues arc very s imil ar 
2. I am willing to put in a great deal or c11ort beyond th at normall ) ex pected 
in order to help thi s organi zati on be succe>s ful 
3. This orga ni zati on inspires my hcstjob pcr lo nnance 
4 . I usually agree with thi s organi zati on's po l i c i ~s on important personnel mn ttcrs 
5. I car~ about the fat e of thi s orga nization 
6. I tell my fri ends that thi s orga ni zation i> a good pl ace to '""' 
7. This is one o f th e bes t o f all orga ni zations lo r" hich to 11 0rl-
8. I am glad I chose th is organi za ti on to "or!- fo r ove r otkrs I was consideri ng 
at the time I jo ined 
9. I am proud to tell o thers th at I am part o f thi> organir.Hi on 
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Davis. Frank fo rter. Vollrath . and Hill 
P~rsona l Power 
Pro mote them or reco1nmend the1n lor pro mot ion 
2. Recommend them fOr l\wards or commendation 
Give th em high I"K::i iOnnancc ril tin gs 
4 . Praise th em 
Give them ex tra time off 
('- Adv ise and ass ist them 
7. Give them good ass ignments 
8. Rel y on his/her good relations with them to get the job done 
9. Rel y on his/her people getting the job done because they do because they don' t 
want to let him/her down 
I 0. Set the example and rel y upon hi s/her peo ple to lo ll ow hi s/her example 
II . Rely on them thinking that it's to their advantage as much as it is to his/her to r 
them to cooperate with him/her 
Power Distance 
I. Demote them or recommend them lo r demoti on 
2. Recommend them lo r di sciplinary acti on or repr imands 
J. G ive them low performance ratin gs 
4. Chew tl1 em out 
5. Give th em ex tra wo rk as punishmc111 
(, Let tl1 em know th at I have the ri ght to ex pec t to have my orders fo ll owed 
7. Expec t th at my orders and requests will be carri ed out because I am the 
boss and they will not ques ti on an ord er from a supaior 
Fxpec t them to fo ll ow my orders because they rea li ze th at I probably ha ve 
inform at ion they don't have and therefOre a good reason for issuing (lil Y order 
9. Ge t them to accompl ish the wo rk by demonstrating th at I know how to 
perlilrm the task 
I 0 Impress them with my overall w mpctencc And ab ility 
I I Make on the sp0t co rrect lOllS 
12. Gi ve th em had assignments 
Pleas«.: indicate your re~1 c t io n to each i.) r the 1t1 llowing s t ~lt ~; IJ l e nt s . 
111\'0 I VC IIIl' rtl 
Within a year. the hoard will become more in volved in how the company 
spends money (R) 
2. Within a ycQr. the iJOQrd wi ll become more in vo lved wi th my deci sions. (R) 
J. Wit hin a yea r. the boa rd will act to promote ri skier strateg ic dec isions. (R) 
C ulture 
I The board sees my initiati ves QS credi ble Qnd attracti ve 
2. The boa rd generall y accepts or complies with my initiati ves 
J. The hoard reli cs on trust more than on mechani sms to control me 
The hoa rd wkes a long-term more th an a short -term view of its relati onship 
wi lh rn c 
Within a year. the boa rd will not change my pc>wcr and Qutl lOr it y 
(R) = It em is reve rse-scaled 
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SD D u 
SD D u 
SD D u 
SD D u 
SD D u 
SD I) u 
SD D u 
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